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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Name:   Ahmad Mahmoud Khalil Hussein 
Title:   Securing Biometric Data 
Major Field:  Computer Science 
Date of Degree:  January 2010 
The emergence of biometric-based person identification in various 
applications, ranging from border security to simple access control, has 
opened the floor to several issues. Authentication and certification of 
biometric content stand at the forefront of these issues. Although praised 
for their robustness and reliability, (multi)biometric systems, like their ID 
and password-based counterparts, are hindered by their vulnerabilities to 
malicious attacks and intentional manipulations. Such alterations would 
nullify their usability for legal and juridical purposes.  
In this thesis, we address several issues related to the certification of 
biometric data. First of all, we define the levels of biometric attacks and 
protection measures to mitigate their effects. The robustness of fuzzy 
xii 
 
vault (FV)-based protection of biometric templates is investigated in 
depth. Iris templates are considered in this work. Also, a new security 
scheme to protect fingerprint data is proposed. Unlike existing 
watermarking-based protection schemes, the proposed one discreetly 
embeds protection payload in salient features of fingerprint images. 
These salient features are estimated using statistical modeling of 
fingerprint edges using the statistical edge process (EP). Moreover, the 
proposed watermarking scheme is characterized by increased robustness 
against attacks due to the "selective" embedding process adopted. 
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 ملخص الرسالة
أحًذ يحًٕد خهٍم حسٍٍ : الإسى
حًاٌح تٍاَاخ أَظًح انرؼشف انحٌٍٕح : ػُٕاٌ انشسانح
ػهى انحاسٕب ٔ انًؼهٕياخ : انرخصص
و  0102 \ 1\ 02: ذاسٌخ انرخشج
انحٍاج، انرؼشف ػهى انشخصٍح  ثٍش يٍ ذطثٍماخإصدادخ أًٍْح انرؼشف ػهى انشخصٍح فً ن
ح أكثش أًٍْح يٍ سٕاتمّ اترذاًء يٍ انرحكى فً إػطاء الأٔنٌٕح إنى تإسرخذاو انصفاخ انحٌٍٕح أصة
غٍشْا يٍ ذطثٍماذٓا انًؼمذج، انرؼشف ػهى انشخصٍح تٕاسطح الأَظًح انحٌٍٕح كاٌ يٍ أْى 
ٔنح الإػرًاد ػهٍٓا فإٌ نٓا تؼض انطشق فً ذحذٌذ انٌٕٓح، ٔ تانشغى يٍ لٕج ْزِ الأَظًح ٔ سّ
لٓا كساتمرٓا يٍ أَظًح انرؼشف انرمهٍذٌح، إر أٌ أي إخرشاق فً ْزِ لاط انضؼف انرً ٌسٓم إخرشاٌ
. لإسرؼًال فً تؼض انذٔائش انمإٍََحلالأَظًح ًٌكٍ أٌ ٌهغً ػًهٓا ٔ ٌجؼهٓا غٍش صانحح 
فً ْزِ انشسانح، سٕف َمٕو ترحذٌذ تؼض انُماط انًًٓح انًرؼهمح تأَظًح انرؼشف انحٌٍٕح 
انضؼف ٔ تؼض يماٌٍس الأياٌ نٓا، حٍث أٌ لٕج انؼمذ انمطٍُح  حذد َماطٌسٕف : انًؼرشفح، أٔوً 
يك تإسرخذايٓا فً حًاٌح شٍفشج لضحٍح انؼٍٍ، كًا أٌ خٕاسصيٍح جذٌذج إلرشحد علذ لًٍد ب
نحًاٌح تٍاَاخ تصًح الإصثغ تإسرخذاو انؼلاياخ انًائٍح، انرؼهٍى انًائً انًسرخذو ٌؼرًذ ػهى 
صج فً صٕس تصًح الإصثغ، انًُاطك انثاسصج حذدخ تٕاسطح إخفاء انثٍاَاخ فً انًُاطك انثاس
ًَٕرج إحصائً نًؼانجح انحذٔد، كًا أٌ لٕج انخٕاسصيٍح انًمرشحح لذ لًٍد إذجاِ تؼض 
 .الإخرشالاخ انًخراسج نفحص لٕذٓا
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
Nowadays personal identity is becoming a very important task in 
governmental and personal procedures like border control, accessing 
sensitive data, bank transactions, etc. An important issue in personal 
identity is to identify a person on a property that cannot be stolen or 
shared such as biometric traits like the fingerprint and iris features. This 
identification process is known as biometric authentication. Traditional 
personal identification methods rely on the use of passwords or personal 
identity (ID) cards. However, these methods suffer from severe 
limitations. For instance, passwords could be forgotten or manipulated. 
ID cards can be spoofed or stolen. Moreover, the holder of these 
authentication documents can claim that he/she was not involved in any 
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specific malicious transaction being investigated. This means that all 
traditional authentication techniques cannot be utilized for negative 
recognition and non-repudiation. Negative recognition enables biometric 
systems to determine whether a certain individual is indeed enrolled in 
the system. Non-repudiation provides tangible evidence on the access to 
specific resources/services by an individual which he/she cannot deny at 
later stages.  
There is a great need for reliable and authenticated identity management 
systems that can “reliably” accommodate a large number of individuals 
or users. Biometric systems can be used for verification and 
identification. Verification is the process of deciding whether the identity 
holder is or not the person having the acquired biometric traits and 
features. Identifying the identity of the person whose biometric traits are 
being acquired represents the identification process. The latter process 
uniquely depends on the acquired biometric traits without resorting to 
any extra knowledge about the person‟s identity. In both processes, 
reliability enables improved recognition rates. 
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1.1.1 Biometric Systems 
Biometrics represents the science and technology of recognizing the 
identity of a person based on his/her own physical or behavioral 
attributes. Physical attributes include fingerprints, iris, palmprint, hand 
geometry, and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Speech, keystrokes, gait, 
and signature are classified as behavioral attributes [1]. Figure 1 gives a 
summary of major physical or behavioral biometric traits commonly 
found in biometric systems. 
Without loss of generality, biometric systems consist of five components: 
1) biometric sensor(s); 2) feature extractor; 3) feature matcher; 4) 
template (feature) database; and 5) decision maker. It should be noted 
that some of these components may not be available in specific biometric 
systems. Some real-world systems include a quality assessment 
component which evaluates the quality of the acquired biometric raw 
data. This component is necessary to ensure the “fitness” of the acquired 
data for further processing to yield reliable decisions. 
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Figure 1: Biometric attributes. 
Biometric sensors (readers or scanners) are used to acquire the raw 
biometric data. Fingerprint scanners and face/iris cameras are commonly 
called biometric sensors. The feature extractor module extracts the 
important features pertaining to the raw biometric data. Feature extraction 
(or reduction) enables “fault-tolerant” biometric systems operating at 
faster processing rates. Multi-dimensional transformations, pattern 
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recognition and data reduction techniques are usually found in such 
components.  
The matcher module operates in the “feature-domain” and performs 
comparisons between the extracted feature and biometric templates stored 
in a (multi)-biometric database. Usually, template biometric databases 
contain stored biometric templates of enrolled persons. Finally, the 
comparison scores are evaluated by the decision maker module using 
specific metrics for matching and verification purposes.  
Depending on their implementation, biometric systems can be either uni-
modal or multi-modal depending on the number of “different” biometric 
traits being used. Multiple traits are considered for improving the system 
performance in terms of accuracy at the expense of increased 
computational payload.  
1.1.2 Biometric System Functionalities  
Biometric systems are design to operate in the following modes [1]: 
1- Enrollment Mode: A common procedure usually taking place at an 
early stage. On need basis, a new person is registered (or enrolled) 
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into the system. Enrollment mode involves the acquisition 
(sensing), feature extraction, and storage processes.  
2- Verification Mode: Usually, this mode takes place at the 
deployment stage. Using the biometric trait(s), a person identity is 
validated against his/her biometric template(s) stored in the 
database. To “biometrically” verify a person‟s identity, sensing, 
feature extraction, matching, and decision making modules are 
utilized. 
3- Identification Mode: In this mode, one-to-many comparisons are 
carried out to search through all templates of all users in the 
database for a possible match. Identification mode involves the 
acquisition (sensing), feature extraction, storage and decision 
making processes.  
The possible functionalities of biometric systems are illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Biometric system functionalities [1]. 
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1.1.3 Biometric System Performance  
It is worth noting that multiple biometric traits of a single user taken at 
different times vary in several aspects. These variations in a single user's 
traits are commonly known as intra-user variations. For instance, in iris-
based systems, a user may move his eyelids while capturing an image or 
the size of the iris may differ according to the surrounding light intensity 
and lighting conditions. Moreover, in fingerprint-based systems, a user 
may press or move his/her finger differently while his/her fingerprint is 
being captured. On the other hand, features extracted from biometric 
traits pertaining to different users can be quite similar. For example, some 
pairs of individuals can have nearly identical facial appearance due to 
genetic factors such as parenthood relations, identical twins, etc. This 
similarity between the biometric traits of different individuals is called 
inter-user similarity. 
Due to these similarities and variations, biometric systems can make two 
types of errors; false accept (FA) and false reject (FR). If the intra-user 
variations are very large, the two traits from the same user will not be 
accepted which represents an FR error. Similarly, if two traits from two 
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different users are considered matching, then an FA error has occurred. 
The latter situation often happens when the inter-user similarity is large. 
Using the two types of errors mentioned above, the basic measures for 
the system performance are [1]:  
1- False Accept Rate (FAR): The FAR represents the proportion of 
matches between two biometric traits from two different users that 
are incorrectly recognized as match.  
2- False Reject Rate (FRR): The FRR represents the fraction of 
matches between two biometric traits from the same user that are 
recognized as pertaining to tow different users.  
3- Genuine Accept Rate (GAR): The GAR represents the proportion 
of matches between two biometric traits from the same user that 
are correctly recognized as match. 
A typical performance measure using these metrics is shown in Figure 
3. 
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Figure 3: Typical performance measures of biometric systems. (a) FAR vs. FRR. (b) FRR vs. FAR (c) 
GAR vs. FAR [1]. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
With the emergence of digital evidence and biometric data, person 
identification and forensic content have been constantly put under doubt 
for their vulnerability to digital forgery and seamless manipulations. 
Recently, safety and security of biometric data and templates have been 
the focus of many researchers due to their impact of the legal acceptance 
of “digital evidence” [2]. It is quite surprising to note that although 
biometric systems are proposed to increase the security of specific 
premises and applications, their own security is questioned at several 
levels. Moreover, due to their private nature, the identity of biometric 
content needs to be protected from illegal access and usage. At this stage, 
     
(a) 
False Accept Rate (%) 
(b) 
False Accept Rate (%) 
(c) 
False Accept Rate (%) 
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a second level of security and protection is addressed. Also, unlike 
conventional passwords, which are usually protected through hard 
encryption, biometric data are usually presented in “clear” or “plain” 
format. Therefore, a potential attack on biometric content and templates 
would be more tempting due to the target easiness. For illustration, a 
person‟s face can be easily captured with or without his consent. At 
various stages, a biometric authentication system is “openly” vulnerable 
to attacks. In response to these issues, this thesis proposes new protection 
and security techniques to increase the robustness of biometric data and 
templates against attacks and manipulations. Cryptography-based fuzzy 
vault scheme is proposed to secure iris templates. To assess the 
robustness of the proposed, a series of experiments are conducted to 
investigate the parameters and system thresholds necessary for such a 
system to “safely” operate under normal conditions. A watermarking-
based protection scheme is propose to secure fingerprint images. It is 
worth noting that fingerprint-based biometric systems dominate the 
biometric market [1]. Because fingerprint ridges are crucial for the 
estimation of minutiae points [3], the proposed scheme discreetly embeds 
watermark payload in edges, the most salient features of a fingerprint 
image. 
12 
 
1.3 Thesis Objectives  
As mentioned above, biometric data or templates need to be secured for 
several reasons. The thesis objectives encompass the security and 
certification of biometric data (and or templates). More specifically, the 
main objectives of this thesis are: 
1- Investigate the security of the fuzzy vault (FV) scheme [4] through 
a detailed cryptanalysis study. The security of biometric templates 
will be considered in depth and system performance is analyzed in 
the presence of several malicious attacks and intentional tamper 
manipulations. 
2- Propose a novel scheme to secure biometric data using a robust 
digital watermarking technique that involves salient biometric 
features such as fingerprint edges. The robustness of the proposed 
security scheme is thoroughly investigated in the presence of 
several malicious attacks and intentional tamper manipulations 
such as image filtering, compression and geometric processing. 
3- Investigate the suitability of the security schemes outlined above 
depending on the application at hand. 
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4- Investigate the security of biometric data without resorting to the 
use of biometric databases. Like storing the biometric template on 
smart cards instead of using database as the case in EyeCerts® and 
FaceCerts® biometric systems. 
Due to the diversity of the biometric templates, we will restrict our 
investigation to the security of biometric templates extracted from iris 
images for the fuzzy-vault scheme. In the case of securing biometric data 
using digital watermarking, only fingerprint images are considered due to 
their suitability to the proposed data embedding technique. In addition, 
the proposed technique will be benchmarked against existing techniques 
used to secure fingerprint images. Finally, for the last thesis objective, 
two well-established certification algorithms: EyeCerts® and FaceCerts® 
are considered. In both cases, there is no template database. However, the 
biometric data is stored on a separate module, namely a biometric card. 
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1.4 Thesis Contributions  
The main contributions for this thesis are summarized as follows: 
1- Demonstrate the robustness of iris-based fuzzy-vault scheme 
against typical template attacks where various image filtering 
techniques are carried out on iris test samples. 
2- Propose a new security scheme for watermarking fingerprint data 
using Edge Process (EP) model. 
3- Apply an in-depth cryptanalysis to the new proposed fingerprint 
watermarking system to demonstrate its improved performance. 
Many image alteration techniques have been applied through 
typical image filters. 
4- Compare the applicability of the security schemes for securing 
biometric templates, biometric data, and certified biometric 
systems. 
5- Demonstrate the functionality of two certified biometric systems 
and highlight their contribution to the protection of biometric 
systems against template database attacks. 
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1.5 Thesis Organization 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II provides a detailed review 
of existing techniques used to secure biometrics templates and data; 
certify biometric systems. A comparative study of the existing techniques 
is given as a summary at the end of this Chapter. Mathematical 
preliminaries for wavelet techniques, edge processing, and wavelet 
modeling are discussed in Chapter III. The main contributions and 
proposed techniques are detailed in Chapter IV. Chapter V discusses the 
experiments and computer simulations carried out in this thesis. A 
detailed summary of the performance results is given therein. Finally, this 
thesis concludes with Chapter VI where a summary of the main thesis 
contributions are outlined along with directions for possible future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, it was indicated that authentication is becoming an 
increasingly important task in many applications and the consequences of 
an insecure authentication method can be catastrophic. In the previous 
Chapter, biometric systems and their importance in authentication 
process have been discussed. In this Chapter, the security of biometric 
systems and the ways for securing biometric systems have been 
discussed. 
Ratha et al. [3] have identified eight points of attacking biometric 
systems as shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 shows that point 1 is an attacking 
point, an attacker can spoof a biometric trait like wearing a contact lenses 
17 
 
or silicon finger to get unauthorized access. While at points 2, 4, 6 and 8, 
an attacker can penetrate the communication channel to get data and 
replay it with another data or interrupt the channel. Feature extractor or 
matcher can be overridden with a Trojan horse to produce incorrect 
results as the case at points 3 and 5. At point 7, an attacker can modify 
the contents of the database. He can modify the biometric templates 
(feature points) or the raw biometric data (biometric images).  
There are many techniques for securing these points. At point 1, sensing 
finger or eye conductivity or pulse can be a good approach for securing 
this point. Accordingly making all the components at points 3, 5 and 7 to 
reside in a secure location can help to protect them from unauthorized 
access. Furthermore, securing biometric templates can be used for point 
7. At points 4, 6 and 8, these attacks can be prevented by using encrypted 
communication channels. 
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Figure 4: Points for attacking biometric system [3]. 
The work in this thesis is concentrated on point 7, how to secure 
biometric data and templates. Three methods for securing biometric data 
have been discussed as the following: fuzzy-vault for securing biometric 
templates, watermarking for securing biometric data, and the certification 
of biometric systems. 
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2.2 Fuzzy-vault Techniques 
Template database can store biometric templates such as fingerprint 
minutiae points, facial features, or iris code. Fuzz-vault scheme can be 
used to secure biometric templates. Fuzzy-vault is a cryptographic 
technique. Encryption and fuzzy-vault are both members of 
cryptography.  
Biometric encryption is a method to encrypt feature points of biometric 
data. There are famous algorithms that can be used for biometric 
encryption such as Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) algorithm, Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES), etc. Jain et al. [5] revised methods of 
biometric encryption and their advantages and disadvantages. They stated 
that standard encryption techniques (like RSA and AES) are not useful 
for securing biometric templates. They indicated that matching cannot be 
done in encrypted domain because a small difference in decrypted data 
will result in a big difference in encrypted data. So for each 
authentication process data will be exposed. Biometric encryption has not 
been discussed deeply in this thesis.  
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Fuzzy-vault is a method of cryptography to secure any set of data using a 
polynomial function of a certain degree. This function called key. Fuzzy-
vault was introduced by Jules and Sudan [4] in 2002. Anybody who has 
majority set of data that are overlapped with vault data can reconstruct 
the data set and hence the key.  
Following is a brief example of fuzzy-vault. Alice places a secret K in a 
vault and locks it using unordered set A. Bob uses an unordered set B to 
unlock the vault to access K. He will succeed if and only if B and A 
overlap substantially [6]. Figure 5 illustrates this example.  
In biometric fuzzy-vault, feature points are the data set. In the case of 
fingerprint biometric systems, data set can be minutiae points. Figure 6 
illustrates minutiae points for fingerprints. 
Uludag et al. [7] have implemented fuzzy-vault for fingerprint by hiding 
minutiae points in the vault. Their system‟s FAR reaches 0% but it has 
high time complexity.  
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Figure 5: Fuzzy-vault example [6]. 
 
Figure 6: Fingerprint minutiae points. 
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Nandakumar et al. [8] have implemented a fingerprint based fuzzy-vault 
by proposing a new alignment technique for fingerprint to achieve high 
performance.  
Nandakumar [9] has proposed a new method to secure iris code using 
fuzzy vault. This technique has been discussed in details in the following 
Section. 
2.2.1 Fuzzy-vault for Iris 
Iris is the angular region of the eye bounded by the pupil and sclera on 
either side. It is formed during fetal development and stabilizes during 
the first two years of life [10]. Each iris is distinctive even among 
identical twins. Figure 7 gives an example of iris showing its location in 
the eye. 
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Figure 7: Iris and other eye components [10]. 
Daugman [11] has proposed a technique to recognize iris images by 
converting each iris to a fixed length binary vector. Multiple instances of 
the same iris should have approximately the same binary vectors. For 
more details, iris recognition has been discussed in details in Chapter 3. 
Iris code is a fixed length binary vector and the relative order information 
between the bits is essential for matching. Because of this iris code 
cannot be secured directly using the fuzzy vault construct. A salt 
invariant transform function has to be applied first to the iris code. After 
that the resulting key can be secured using fuzzy-vault construct. This is 
what was proposed by Nandakumar [9]. Figure 8 illustrates fuzzy-vault 
encoding and decoding processes. 
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Figure 8: Vault encoding and decoding. 
In vault-encoding process, two tasks need to be applied. In the first task a 
random key is generated and has been applied to the iris code as 
invertible transform function. It consists of BCH encoding to the 
transformation key and exclusive-or it with the iris code. In the second 
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task, the transformation key will be secured using fuzzy-vault construct. 
There will be a second key for securing the transformation and a set of 
random chaff points. Random chaff points are random points used to 
make the reconstruction of the second key infeasible. Chaff points play 
an important role in increasing the security of fuzzy-vault construct. 
In vault-decoding process, inverse transform has been applied. It also 
consists of two tasks, exclusive-or between the transformed iris code and 
the query iris code. After that, BCH decoding will take place to produce 
the transformed key. Sometimes the resulting transformed key contains 
some errors because of intra-user variations. If the template and query iris 
code are sufficiently similar, then the recovered key should be 
sufficiently similar to the original key and the vault is decoded 
successfully. Fuzzy-vault for iris data has been implemented and 
discussed in details in Chapter 4. 
2.3 Biometric Certification Techniques 
Certification of biometric system represents developing a biometric 
system to store biometric templates on a separate media that certify the 
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association of contents like smart cards. Every enrolled person should 
have this card. In matching process data will be retrieved from this card. 
Unlike traditional biometric systems which retrieve data from an external 
database. A database may can be used, but not for matching. For 
example, new user wants to be registered; a preliminary check should be 
made to make sure that he/she did not already register. 
Two famous certified biometric systems have been discussed here 
EyeCerts [12] and FaceCerts [13]. Each system is discussed in details in 
the following two Sections. 
2.3.1 EyeCerts® 
This system was developed by Schonberg and Kirovski [12]. EyeCerts is 
an offline system used to identify people by their irises. It offers a 
certified document that certifies the association of content on the 
document with iris feature. This system is highly cost effective and does 
not require high complexity. The system extracts and compresses the 
unique feature of a given iris using limited storage.  
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EyeCerts
®
 is a printed document consists of two parts: arbitrary text and a 
barcode as shown in Figure 9. The barcode encodes the digital signature 
of iris feature and arbitrary text associated with the holder of the iris data. 
Iris feature is represented as a compressed image of the cardholder‟s iris.  
 
Figure 9: EyeCerts System [12]. 
As seen from Figure 9 that the system has two parts issuer and Verifier. 
EyeCert
®
 issuer scans the iris of human and compresses it. During iris 
capturing, identity text is entered to system t. Text t and compressed iris b 
will be concatenated together to produce a message m. A suitable hash 
function H is used to hash message m. Then, the result of the hash 
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function h will be signed with the issuer‟s private key producing s. 
Finally, the signature s and the iris data b will be encoded as a bar code 
and printed on the identity card. 
EyeCert
®
 Verifier scans the iris and compresses it b’. Simultaneously, the 
system will scan the barcode to extract iris data b’’ and s’’ and scan the 
printed identity text t’’. Iris data b’’ and text t’’ will be concatenated 
together to form message m’’. m’’ will be hashed by using a hash 
function to produce h’. s’’ will be decrypted by using the issuer‟s public 
key to produce h’’. A comparison will be made for h’ and h’’ and b’ and 
b’’ and according to distance threshold measure, authentication will be 
decided. 
2.3.2 FaceCerts® 
FaceCerts
®
 has the same idea of EyeCerts
®
 but it is for face biometric 
data. It was developed by Kirovski and Jojic [13]. It is simple, 
inexpensive and graphically secure identity system. FaceCerts
® 
document 
has a printout of person‟s portrait photo, an arbitrary text, and a color 
barcode. Also it is an offline system and does not require high end printer 
technology. So because of this it does not require smart cards, all these 
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data can be printed on a paper, thus reducing cost. FaceCerts
®
 is a good 
choice for driving license, passport, or visa identification. Figure 10 
illustrates FaceCerts System. 
 
 
Figure 10: FaceCerts system [13]. 
As seen from Figure 10 that FaceCerts
®
 document include: portrait photo 
of holder, arbitrary text, and colored bar code. Bar code encodes an RSA 
signature of the message hash and compressed representation of the face 
encompassed by the photo. From Figure 10 it is noticed that textual data 
pass a text hashing process. Textual data is hashed using a 
cryptographically secure hashing algorithm. The resulting hash is denoted 
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as t. Facial features on the photo are compressed using an algorithm that 
identifies the facial structure and compresses its features. A symbiotic 
eigenface - DCT based algorithm has been used for compressing the 
facial features.  
Eigenfaces define eigen vectors of the set of faces that defines the face-
space. They don‟t necessarily correspond to isolated features such as 
eyes, ears, and noses [14]. Eigenfaces formed by taking a set of images 
under the same lighting conditions and normalizing to line up the eyes 
and mouths. Figure 11 shows an example of eigenfaces. 
After that eigenfaces can be extracted by using Principled Component 
Analysis (PCA). PCA is a data analysis technique that provides a 
roadmap for how to reduce a complex dataset to a lower dimension to 
reveal the hidden simplified structure that often underlie it [15].  
Return back to Figure 10, after text hashing t and photo compression f, 
both are merged into a message m. After that m will be encrypted using 
RSA algorithm with issuer‟s private key to produce the barcode. 
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Figure 11: Eigenface example. 
At verifier side, verifier will scan photo, barcode, and text. Text will be 
hashed to produce t’. Barcode is decrypted with the issuer‟s public key to 
produce message m’. Then from m’ and t’, a compressed photo f’ can be 
achieved. f’ will be decompressed and compared with the scanned photo. 
After that, verifier can make decision for authentication. 
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2.4 Watermarking Techniques 
As mentioned earlier, biometric systems have advantages over traditional 
personal identification techniques and the security of the systems data 
require careful treatment. Digital image watermarking can be used to 
achieve security of biometric data. Digital image watermarking is a 
technique used for authentication, tamper-proof digital content and 
protection of digital copyright. It is based on embedding specific 
information called watermark into host information or cover. Watermark 
can be company logo, copyright signature, etc. 
Hembrooke [16, 17] has first described digital watermarking in his 1954 
patent. It was a method for embedding an identification code into music 
fragments. This innovation idea is to improve the music ownership and 
intellectual property.   
As discussed in Section 2.2, securing biometric templates through 
encryption is weak while the biometric data is decrypted. Therefore, 
biometric cryptography does not address the overall security of the 
biometric content. In this regard, digital watermarking can embed some 
information in biometric data, so it can provide security even for 
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decrypted data. In addition, this can provide a tracking mechanism for 
identifying the origin of the biometric data like FBI for example. On the 
other hand, watermarking can make the modification of the data by a 
pirate useless.  
2.4.1 Watermarking Overview 
Digital copyright protection is in a great demand as a measure for data 
security and protection. Digital watermarking has been developed to meet 
the needs of these growing concerns. Recently, it is witnessed a growing 
interest from research and commercial communities. Until recently, 
cryptography was deemed the “de-facto” solution for data security and 
protection. However, once the encrypted data is decrypted, it becomes an 
“open” platform for manipulations, altering and forgery. As a remedy to 
this deficiency, digital watermarking solutions are proposed instead since 
they can protect the protected content in “open” as well as in “closed” 
environments.  
Moreover, digital watermarking technology is not new since it has been 
used in the paper industry for decades. For instance, any bank note holds 
a “semi-visible” paper watermark which becomes visible when the bank 
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note is held up to the light and looked at it. Figure 12 illustrates an 
example of such paper watermarks on a US bank note of US 20$. In 
paper industry, the watermark directly is inserted into the paper during 
the papermaking process. This insertion makes it very hard to remove the 
watermark and therefore very hard to forge the bank note [18]. 
 
Figure 12: A sample bank note of 20 US $ [18]. 
A digital watermark is defined as the extra information (or payload) that 
is imperceptibly and robustly embedded into the host data. A digital 
watermark typically contains information about the origin, status, or 
recipient of the host data [19]. Digital watermarks can be perceptible or 
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imperceptible. Imperceptible digital watermarks are more desired than 
perceptible watermarks in multimedia applications [19].  
Digital watermarks can be classified according to their visibility into 
public (visible) or private (visible to authorized parties only). Private 
digital watermarks require special techniques to locate and extract. 
Unlike private watermarks, public one‟s can be seen by everyone without 
any extraction or location processes. Private digital watermarks should be 
located and extracted by authorized parties to protect host information 
against any type of alteration and/or modification [20]. 
2.4.1.1 Digital Watermarking Applications 
Digital watermarking techniques can be used in (and for) many 
applications such as: 
1- Copyright Watermarks or Copyright Protection: Used to embed 
creator/author information in the content [17]. 
2- Fingerprinting Watermarks: Used to enable tracking and tracing 
specific copies of the copyrighted contents. 
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3- Broadcast Watermarks: Used to protect media from being 
physically copied. 
4- Annotation Watermarks: Provide a technique for embedding image 
metadata into the image itself. 
5- Integrity Watermarks or Fraud Detection and Correction: Ensure 
the image authenticity or indicate any malicious content alteration 
[21].  
6- Data Hiding Watermarks: Used to conceal hidden or secret 
information in an image (like steganography). 
7- Bandwidth-Conserving Hybrid Transmission: Offers an 
opportunity to reuse and share existing spectrum to either 
backwards-compatibly to increase the capacity of an existing 
communication network such as legacy network [22, 23]. 
2.4.1.2 Digital Watermarking Systems 
As mentioned in the previous Sections, digital watermarking represents a 
viable solution for copyright protection and tamper-proofing of digital 
content. Hartung [19] defined digital watermarking as embedding 
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information such as origin, destination, and access levels of multimedia 
data into the multimedia data itself.  
The basic idea of a digital watermarking system is to add a watermark 
data to the host data to be watermarked. After receiving the watermarked 
host data by authorized parties, the embedded watermark payload can be 
recovered by using an appropriate decoding technique and proper 
decoding keys. Figure 13 gives the functionality of a typical digital 
watermarking system as described by Hartung [19].  
 
Figure 13: Typical digital watermarking system. a) Watermark encoding stage. b) Watermark 
decoding stage [19]. 
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As shown from Figure 13, the watermark signal W, embedded into the 
host data X, can be a function of watermark information I and an 
embedding key K as defined below: 
),(0 KIfW    (1) 
 Possibly, it may also depend on the host data X: 
),,(0 XKIfW    (2) 
The watermark information I is any information like the owner of the 
data and it can be used to increase the security of the entire system. The 
key also can be used to generate locations of altered signal components 
or the altered values. 
After watermark creation, the watermark (W) is embedded into the host 
data to generate watermarked data (Y) such that: 
),(1 WXfY    (3) 
The above operations are the watermark encoding. In watermark 
decoding, the embedded watermarked information or some confidence 
measure should be used to indicate the probability that a given watermark 
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is available in the test data. This is generated by using the original data 
as: 
),,(* KYXgI    (4) 
Or without the original data: 
),(* KYgI          (5) 
During watermark embedding, it is desired to keep the effects of 
watermark signal as imperceptible as possible in invisible watermarking 
applications. So the end user should not notice quality degradation in the 
signal due to watermarking. Because of this problem, some form of 
masking is generally used. For example, in audio watermarking, the 
frequency masking properties of the human auditory system (HAS) can 
be considered in designing the watermark. Also the masking effect of 
edges can be used in image watermarking. In the visible watermarking is 
the opposite case. No need to consider these masks. 
Digital watermarking methods exist for almost all types of multimedia 
data, but they are much larger for image applications. They can be used 
to watermark images, audio, video, text, signals, and so on. 
40 
 
2.4.1.3 Classification of Watermarking Systems  
Loo [24] has classified watermarking systems according to the following 
attributes: 
1- Adaptability: Implies the consideration of an embedding model to 
control/adjust the watermark strength according to the strength of 
the host data. The most common models include the human 
visual/auditory systems (HVS/HAS) for image/video and audio 
digital watermarking systems, respectively. 
2- Embedding Domain: The domain of the host data (host content) 
where the watermark payload is embedded. The embedding 
process can modify (alter) the attributes of the host signal which 
can be the coefficients of the host signal in the original domain 
(e.g., time or space) or in a “dual” transform domain (e.g., 
frequency or time-scale). Such transform domains can be 
implemented using the Fourier Cosine Transform (DCT), or the 
Discrete Wavelet Transforms (DWT). 
3- Oblivious versus Non-oblivious: In oblivious digital watermarking 
systems, the watermark decoding (recovery) stage requires the 
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presence of the original host data for decoding purposes. However, 
in the case of non-oblivious systems, the original host content is 
not required. It should be noted that former systems are more 
robust to synchronization attacks. 
4- Formation of the Composite Host Signal (Host Data): The 
watermark payload can be added to the host signal coefficients 
using an appropriate embedding algorithm. In non-additive 
watermarking systems, the content of the host content may 
undergo specific modifications to quantify the presence of the 
watermark payload. 
5- Watermark Encoding: The watermark payload may require extra 
encoding to ensure robustness against transmission errors such as 
deletions and insertions. The watermarking strengthening process 
may include the incorporation of error control codes (ECCs) to 
mitigate the effects of the anticipated communication errors. 
6- Watermark Robustness: Enables the watermark payload with 
resilience against intentional and accidental attacks. For instance, 
the design of the digital watermarking system should take into 
account robustness against unintentional manipulations such as 
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JPEG (image compression) or MPEG (video compression) and 
format conversions.  
2.4.2 Watermarking for Biometric Systems 
The applications of digital watermarking systems for securing and 
protecting biometric systems started to emerge recently. Ratha et al. [25] 
have proposed a data hiding method for fingerprint images in the wavelet 
scalar quantization (WSQ) compressed stream. The Discrete Wavelet 
Transform (DWT) coefficients are changed during WSQ encoding. This 
may cause possible image degradation and it should be taken into 
consideration. In Figure 14, original fingerprint image and watermarked 
fingerprint image are displayed. The second fingerprint has embedded 
data which is randomly generated bits and its size around 160-bytes. It is 
noticed in Figure 14 that the quality does not affected strictly.  
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Figure 14: Compressed domain fingerprint watermarking a) Input fingerprint b) Fingerprint with 
data embedded [25]. 
Pankanti and Yeung [26] have proposed a watermarking technique for 
fingerprint image verification. Their technique was a fragile 
watermarking technique in which a spatial watermark is embedded in the 
spatial domain of a fingerprint image by utilizing a verification key. If 
any region of the watermarked image has been tampered, it can be 
localized directly. So this technique can be used to check the integrity of 
the fingerprint images. In Figure 15, the used watermark and the 
watermarked image are displayed. 
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Figure 15: Fragile fingerprint watermarking a) Watermark b) Watermarked fingerprint image [26]. 
Pankanti and Yeung [26] technique does not lead to a significant 
performance loss in fingerprint verification. They proofed that by 
calculating the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves on a 
database comprised of 1000 fingerprints. They have calculated (ROC) 
curves before and after the fingerprints were watermarked. They 
observed that curves are very close to each other which mean no 
significant performance loss.  
Gunsel et al. [27] have described two techniques for watermarking 
fingerprint images. The first technique uses Gradient Orientation 
Analysis in watermarking embedding. Features that are extracted using 
gradient information will not be altered. The second technique keeps the 
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singular points in the fingerprint image, for example, into arch or right 
loop classes.  
Low et al. [28] have presented a preliminary study on biometric 
watermarking. Their method is digitizing the offline handwritten 
signature into binary bit string as hidden biometric watermark. Three 
selected biometric watermarking techniques have been used. These 
techniques are Least Significant Bit (LSB) substitution, CDMA spread 
spectrum in spatial domain, and CDMA spread spectrum Discrete 
Wavelet Transform (DWT). Their performance criteria based on human 
visual inspection, Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) and distortion rate. 
They have showed that CDMA spread spectrum in DWT is the best one 
in their results.  
The same team (Low et al.) [29] have presented another biometric 
watermarking to embed handwritten signature in a host image as a notice 
of legitimate ownership. Their method‟s performance is validated against 
simulated frequency and geometric attacks, which include JPEG 
compression, low pass filtering, median filtering, noise addition, scaling, 
and rotation cropping. The results revealed that their method is able to 
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endure severe degradation on the host accuracy as their method showed 
remarkable robustness even if the host is strictly distorted.  
Hong et al. [30] have presented a bit priority-based biometric 
watermarking. They stated that if the embedded biometric data are 
numeric, then the retrieval error will be very high. Their method is based 
on amplitude modulation and bit priority to embed high priority bits at 
good positions to reduce the retrieval error when they are converted to 
numeric data. Their experimental results showed a significant error 
reduction. 
Jung et al. [31] have presented a method that identifies users at H.264 
streaming by using fingerprints watermarking. Their system can survive 
under very low bit-rate compression. Fingerprint images are enhanced 
and a watermark is inserted with Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) 
technique. Their method achieved robust watermark extraction against 
H.264 compressed videos. 
A robust fingerprint embedding scheme in the wavelet maxima points of 
fingerprint images is proposed by Ghouti [32]. In this scheme, minutiae 
points are not altered. 
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2.4.3 Detailed Biometric Watermarking Techniques 
In this Section two techniques for watermarking biometric data have been 
discussed. Both techniques have the same data hiding method but they 
differ in the characteristics of the embedded data, the host image carrying 
that data, and the medium of data transfer. Both techniques were 
proposed by Uludag [33]. 
The first technique is a stegonography based technique. In this technique, 
biometric features like fingerprint minutiae are hidden in a host image 
and transmitted via a non-secure communication channel. The function of 
the host image is just to carry data. This can be used for example, to 
transmit the fingerprint minutiae from any authorized verifier to the 
template database and vice versa. The security of this system is based on 
the secrecy of the communication channel. There is no relationship 
between the host image and the hidden data. Figure 16 illustrates this 
technique. 
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Figure 16: First technique for biometric watermarking [33]. 
One way for confusing the attacker, is to hide fingerprint minutiae in any 
synthetic fingerprint image. So the attacker will take this image and deals 
with it as a real fingerprint image without knowing that it carries 
minutiae data of another fingerprint. The security of this technique can be 
increased by encrypting the host image before transmission. 
The second technique used to hide facial information such as eigenface 
coefficients into fingerprint images. Marked fingerprint image of a 
person can be stored in a smart card. Any person can use his own smart 
card in the verifier site. The fingerprint will be sensed and compared to 
the fingerprint stored on the smart card. After that facial information 
hidden in a fingerprint will be extracted to recover the face. The 
recovered face will be used as a second source for authentication either 
automatically or by a human in a supervised biometric application. Figure 
17 illustrates the second technique for biometric watermarking. 
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Figure 17: Second technique for biometric watermarking [33]. 
 
2.5 Comparative Study of the Existing 
Techniques 
Techniques for securing biometric templates are compared according to 
the eight points of attack which illustrated at Figure 4. Table 1 shows this 
comparison. 
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Attacks  Fuzzy-vault Biometric Certification Biometric 
Watermarking 
Fake biometric Yes Yes Yes 
Replay Data Yes No No 
Overriding 
(feature extractor) 
Yes No Yes 
Synthesizing Yes No Yes 
Overriding 
(matcher) 
Yes No Yes 
Intercept Channel Yes 
 
No Yes 
Modifying Data Yes No No 
Synthesizing Yes No Yes 
Table 1: Comparison for biometric template security techniques. 
From Table 1, it is noticed that at point 1 this attack can be applied to all 
techniques because it depends on the biometric sensor or scanner more 
than the biometric data. 
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At point 2, biometric certification technique and watermarking technique 
do not have replay data attack. This is because the biometric certification 
technique is an offline system. So there is no external communication 
channel and nobody can access this system from external. For 
watermarking technique, any modification happen to the watermarked 
image will be exposed because watermarking offers a tamper-proof 
mechanism.   
At point 3, 4, 5, and 6, just the certification of biometric system technique 
is safe from this attack because the system is offline. 
At point 7, fuzzy-vault technique can just be attacked and modified if the 
attacker. For the certification of biometric system technique, there is no 
database to be modified. All the data encrypted and stored on the smart 
card. For watermarking, any modification happen to the watermarked 
image it will be exposed and this is one of the advantages of 
watermarking. 
At point 8, certification of biometric system still safe from synthesizing 
because it is offline but the other schemes are not.  
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CHAPTER 3 
MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES 
In this Chapter, mathematical and technical preliminaries, required for 
the development of the proposed techniques, are outlined. First, 
transform-based iris representation is explained since it is used for the 
development of the fuzzy-vault for securing iris templates. Then, the 
discrete wavelet transform is discussed given that it constitutes the 
foundation for the edge process (EP) model and the watermark 
embedding process. Since the EP process is based on statistical modeling 
of the wavelet coefficients, two well-known statistical wavelet modeling 
techniques are briefly reviewed; the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) 
and the Generalized Gaussian Distribution (GDD). While the GMM is 
used in the EP model to classify edges from background information, the 
GDD is used for the watermark extraction process. Finally, the Chapter 
concludes with some applications of the EP model on biometric raw data 
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to demonstrate its ability to effectively capture image edges in the 
wavelet domain.  
3.1 Iris Representation  
Iris is the angular region of the eye that is bounded by the pupil and 
sclera on either side. Figure 7 shows the iris and eye components. 
Daugman [11], among others, has proposed an efficient compact iris 
representation based on the Gabor wavelet. Although many systems have 
been developed for iris recognition, Daugman‟s system is dominantly 
used in most available commercial iris recognition systems.  
To obtain a compact iris representation, the iris image undergoes many 
processing tasks. These tasks are: segmentation, normalization, and 
feature encoding. Each task is explained in detail in the following 
Sections. 
3.1.1 Iris Segmentation 
The segmentation phase is used to isolate the iris region from the other 
parts in the eye image. Eye image quality plays an important role in the 
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successful implementation of segmentation. Segmentation can be done 
using Hough transform [52]. Hough transform is used to determine the 
parameters of simple geometric objects such as lines and circles. 
Therefore, it is a good approach to deduce the radius and centre 
coordinates of the pupil and iris regions.  
Segmentation is carried out as follows. First, an edge map of the iris 
image is generated by calculating the first derivatives of intensity values 
and apply a threshold on the resulting edge intensities. Second, circles are 
determined by considering the connected line passing through each edge 
point. The radius r and centre coordinates (x, y) define a circle according 
to the following equation: 
022  ryx         (6) 
Figure 18 illustrates an eye image and its edge maps resulting from 
Hough transform. 
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Figure 18: a) iris image b) edge map c) horizontal edge map d) vertical edge map [10]. 
An important point in segmenting the iris image is that eyelids may affect 
the circular shape of the extracted iris. Wildes et al. [34] have used the 
parabolic Hough transform to circumvent this problem. Parabolic arcs are 
used to approximate the upper and lower eyelids. As indicate in Figure 
18, the eyelids are usually horizontally aligned. Taking the vertical 
gradients for locating the iris boundary is going to reduce the influence of 
the eyelids. Figure 19 shows an iris image after segmentation using the 
Hough transform as implemented by Masek [10].  
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Figure 19: a) Iris image. b) Segmented iris image. 
3.1.2 Iris Normalization  
After the iris region is successfully segmented, it has a shape of a 
doughnut. It should be transformed to fixed dimensions so that it would 
be easier for representation. It should be noted that there may be 
dimensional inconsistencies between eye images due to the stretching of 
the iris caused by pupil dilation, varying image distance, rotation of the 
camera, head tilt, and rotation of the eye. The normalization process 
results in iris regions with similar dimensions. 
The first step in normalization is to convert the polar coordinates of iris 
region to the Cartesian coordinates. Daugman [11] proposed a conversion 
process called the rubber sheet model. In this model, circled iris are 
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converted to a rectangular representation by transforming the Cartesian 
coordinates to a polar representation. The coordinate conversion is given 
by [11]: 
    ),()),(),,((  rIryrxI            (7) 
with 
)()()1(),(  lp rxxrrx   (8) 
)()()1(),(  lp ryyrry   (9) 
where I(x, y) is the iris region image, (x, y) are the original Cartesian 
coordinates, (r, ) are the corresponding normalized polar coordinates, 
and xp, yp and xl, yl are the coordinates of the pupil and iris boundaries 
along the  direction.  
The rubber sheet model takes into consideration pupil dilation and size 
inconsistencies in order to produce normalized iris with constant 
dimensions. The pupil center is going to be the reference point. Radial 
vectors pass through the iris region and the number of data points 
selected along each radial line is going to be the radial resolution. The 
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number of radial lines going around the iris region is called the angular 
resolution.  
Sometimes, the pupil can be non-concentric to the iris circle. A 
remapping formula should be used to cover this problem. The remapping 
formula is needed to rescale points depending on the angle around the 
circle. Equation (10) gives the remapping formula. 
22'
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rr       (10) 
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where xc and yc are the centre coordinates of the pupil, r’ is the distance 
between the edge of the pupil and the edge of the iris at an angle   
around the region, and rI is the radius of the iris. Figure 20 illustrates the 
remapping formula. 
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For each radial line, a constant number of points are chosen. These points 
are taken irrespective of how narrow or wide the radius of a particular 
angle is. Normalization produces a 2D array with horizontal dimensions 
of angular resolution and vertical dimensions of radial resolution.  
It was noticed in the segmentation process that eyelids can affect the iris 
circle. Hence, non-iris regions are removed from the normalized 
representation. Data points that occur along the pupil border or the iris 
border are going to be discarded. Figure 21 shows the iris image after 
normalization. 
 
Figure 20: The remapping formula [10]. 
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Figure 21: Iris normalization [10]. 
3.1.3 Feature Encoding 
After the iris region has been successfully segmented and normalized, it 
needs to be encoded into a set of binary bits for storage and matching. 
Feature encoding means that the most discriminating information in iris 
pattern is going to be encoded to produce the iris code. Matching between 
iris images is based on these codes.  
Gabor filters are used to extract the features from iris images. They 
provide optimum joint representation of a signal in spatial and frequency 
domains. A Gabor filter can be constructed by modulating a sine/cosine 
wave with a Gaussian. Sine wave is localized in frequency domain but 
not in time domain. Modulation of the sine with a Gaussian provides 
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localization in time domain but with loss of localization in frequency 
domain.  
The signal is decomposed using a quadrature pair of Gabor filters, with 
the real part specified by a cosine modulated by a Gaussian and the 
imaginary part specified by a sine modulated by a Gaussian. 
The bandwidth of the filter is specified by the width of the Gaussian. The 
centre frequency of the filter is specified by the frequency of the 
sine/cosine wave. 
Daugman [11] has used a 2D version of Gabor filters to encode the iris 
data pattern. A 2D Gabor filter for an image domain (x, y) can be 
represented as follows: 
   )()(2/)(/)( 0000220220 .),( yyvxxuyyxx eeyxG     (13) 
where (x0, y0) specify the position in the image, (α, β) specify the 
effective width and length, and (u0, v0) specify modulation. The real and 
imaginary parts of 2D Gabor filters are show in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22: a) Real part characterized by a cosine modulated by a Gaussian b) Imaginary part 
characterized by a sine modulated by a Gaussian [10]. 
The output of the Gabor filters can be demodulated by quantizing the 
phase information into four levels for each possible quadrant in the 
complex plane. This demodulation is used to compress the data. Phase 
information provides the most significant information within an image. 
So taking the phase information is going to be used to encode iris 
information. 
The four levels are represented using two bits of data. A total 2048 bits 
are calculated for the template. This creates a 256-byte iris template that 
can be used for efficient storage and comparison. Figure 23 illustrates the 
process of feature encoding using 1D Gabor filters using Masek‟s 
implementation of Daugman algorithm [10]. 
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Figure 23: Feature encoding using 1D Gabor filters [10]. 
3.2 Wavelet Transform 
Digital watermarking can be classified according to the embedding 
domain as explained in Section 2.4.1.3. Watermark signals can be 
embedded either in the spatial (time) or transform domain. Generally, 
transform domain always provides better robustness against attacks. The 
embedded watermark will be less perceptible in transform domain due to 
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the spread of the watermark signal over many spatial frequencies and 
better modeling of human visual system (HVS) [33]. 
There are two main types of transforms: Fourier and Wavelet transforms. 
Both transforms are introduced in the next section where the major 
differences between them are highlighted. 
3.2.1 Wavelet and Fourier Transforms 
The Fourier transform (FT) represents the process of transforming a 
signal from the time (spatial) domain to the frequency domain. On the 
other hand, the Wavelet transform (WT) is based on small waves called 
wavelets of varying frequency and limited duration. The WT captures not 
only frequency contents, but also temporal (spatial) contents like time 
(space) at which these frequencies occur. Both transforms can capture 
frequency which is a good similarity. However, there are dissimilarities. 
WT uses wavelet functions that are localized in space. This means that 
data are made sparse when they are transformed into the WT domain. 
The FT does not have this property. This sparseness can be utilized in a 
number of useful applications such as data compression, detecting 
features in images, and noise removal from time series [35].  
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Figure 24 illustrates a Windowed Fourier Transform (WFT). The window 
is simply a square wave. This window truncates the sine or cosine 
functions to fit a window of specific width. A single window is used for 
all frequencies in the WFT, so that the resolution of the analysis is the 
same at all locations in the time frequency plane. 
 
Figure 24: Windowed Fourier Transform (WFT) window [35]. 
In the WT, the windows vary. The WT has short-high frequency basis 
functions. This helps to obtain a detailed frequency analysis and isolate 
signal discontinuities. Figure 25 illustrates Daubechies wavelet in the 
time-frequency plane. 
Also, the WT has an infinite set of possible basis functions unlike the FT 
which has just a single set of basis functions that utilizes sine and cosine 
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functions. This results in a number of different wavelet families. For each 
family, there are subclasses which can be distinguished by the number of 
coefficients, the level of iteration, and the number of vanishing moments. 
Figure 26 gives some examples of wavelet families. 
 
Figure 25: Daubechies Wavelet in time-frequency plane [35]. 
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Figure 26: Different Wavelet families [35]. 
3.2.2 Data Analysis using Wavelet Transform 
In the WT, Ψ(x) represents the mother function of the wavelet functions 
used in the iterative construction of the WT. In fact, Ψ(x) defines an 
orthogonal basis given by: 
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where s and l are integers that scale and dilate the mother function Ψ(x) to 
generate the wavelet functions. The scale index s indicates the wavelet 
width and l is a location index which gives its position. The mother 
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function, Ψ(x), can be rescaled or dilated by powers of two and translated 
by integers. This means that once the mother function is known, 
everything about the basis functions can be derived as there are 
similarities between wavelet bases. These similarities are caused by the 
scales and dilations. 
The analysis of the domain of the data being analyzed can be spanned at 
different resolutions. The scaling function is given by: 
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W(x) is the scaling function for the mother function Ψ(x), and ck are the 
wavelet coefficients. Wavelet coefficients must satisfy linear and 
quadratic constraints of the form: 
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where ζ is the delta function and l is the location index. 
The WT has continuous and discrete implementations. In this thesis, the 
discrete implementation given by the Discrete Wavelet Transform 
(DWT) is considered. However, other implementations such as the Fast 
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Wavelet Transform (FWT), Wavelet Packets (WP) and Adapted 
Waveforms exist [35]. 
3.2.3 Two-Dimensional Wavelet Transform 
In two-dimensional (2D) WT, a 2D signal (such as a digital image) is 
decomposed into a set of band-limited components. These components 
are called subbands. Subbands can be used to reconstruct the input 2D 
signal without errors. Hence, a 2D WT can be a good technique for image 
compression. Subbands are generated by band pass filtering of the input 
image. The size of any subband is smaller than the original image by half. 
Sub-bands are down-sampled but without loss of information. 
Reconstruction of the image is accomplished by up-sampling, filtering 
and summing the individual sub-bands.  
Figure 27 illustrates the process of the 2D WT. As illustrated, the input 
image is processed by two filters (low-pass and high-pass) in parallel. 
When the image passes through any of these filters, it will be down-
sampled by half. The same process is repeated iteratively to achieve a 
specific decomposition level. For example, Figure 28 shows an example 
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of a simple image. After applying the 2D WT, four subbands have been 
generated as shown in Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 27: Wavelet Transform Process. 
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Figure 28: Example of a sample image. 
 
Figure 29: The Wavelet transform of the image in Figure 28. 
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Starting from the upper left quadrant in Figure 29 and moving clockwise, 
the four quadrants represent the approximation subband, the horizontal 
detail subband, the diagonal detail subband and the vertical detail 
subband, respectively. For image reconstruction, the inverse process is 
carried out by up-sampling, filtering and merging the sub-images until 
the image is reconstructed. 
3.3 Wavelet Modeling 
In this Section, two techniques for wavelet modeling have been 
demonstrated: the Gaussian Mixture Model and Generalized Gaussian 
Distribution. 
3.3.1 Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) 
The Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) is a probabilistic model for the 
estimation of the density. It is a model that consists of a number of 
Gaussian functions. These Gaussian functions are combined to provide a 
multimodal density. Component densities are linearly combined as 
follows: 
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where )( jP is the mixing parameter or the prior probability of the data 
points having been generated from component j of the mixture. All the 
priors are chosen to satisfy the conditions: 
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Then, the component density function for  jxp |  can be normalized to 
become a class-conditioned density as follows [36]: 
  1| dxjxp    (19) 
Data points can be generated from the probability distribution by 
selecting a component j randomly with probability )( jP . After that, a data 
point is generated from the corresponding component density  jxp | . 
Individual component densities are given by Gaussian distribution 
functions. Gaussians have a covariance matrix which is a scalar multiple 
of the identity matrix. This shows that I
jj
2 . Where I is the identity 
matrix and 
j
2  is the variance of the component j. So,  jxp |  is given by: 
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where j  is the mean value of density component j. 
Many techniques have been developed for fitting GMM to a set of 
training data [36]. These techniques belong to the Maximum Likelihood 
(ML) family of algorithms which try to maximize the likelihood of the 
parameters for the given data set. There are many approaches for the ML-
based algorithms including the negative log-likelihood, expectation 
maximization and stochastic estimation of parameters [36]. 
Several applications based on GMM modeling have emerged in various 
science and engineering fields. Raja et al. [37] use GMM to model the 
colors of an object to perform certain tasks such as real-time color 
tracking and segmentation. McKenna et al. [38] use GMM for on-line 
adaptation of models to cope with slowly-varying lighting conditions. 
3.3.2 Generalized Gaussian Density (GGD) 
Generalized Gaussian Density (GGD), also known as Generalized 
Gaussian Distribution, is a model that can be used to capture the global 
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behavior of the subband wavelet coefficients. Laplacian probability 
density function (PDF) is a special case of GGD when the shape 
parameter  is equal to 1. The GGD is defined by [39]: 
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where  (.) is the Gamma function ( 
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), z > 0,   is the 
scale parameter, and   is the shape parameter. The scale parameter  
models the width of the PDF peak. The shape parameter   is inversely 
proportional to the decreasing rate of the peak.  
Do et al. [39] use GGD for texture retrieval in the wavelet domain. They 
combine two related tasks to GGD: feature extraction (FE) and similarity 
measurement (SM). Their method improves the texture retrieval rate 
from 65% to 77%. 
Like GMM, the parameters of the GGD model can be estimated by using 
various techniques such as the ML, Moment Matching (MM), and 
Moment / Newton-Step (MNS). Varanasi and Aazhang [40] provide an 
investigation of the last three techniques where the ML algorithm is 
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found significantly superior for heavy-tailed distributions. It should be 
noted that the MM scheme works well if the region of the parameter 
space is in the vicinity of the Gaussian distribution. Finally, the MNS 
technique performs best for light-tailed distributions. 
3.4 Edge Process (EP) Model 
The Edge Process (EP) is a statistical model used to separate texture and 
edges regions from background or flat regions. It is mainly used for data 
compression and data hiding applications because edge regions are the 
best candidates for data hiding and textured regions are suitable for 
removal by compression without introducing noticeable distortions. The 
EP model has also many other applications. 
Moulin and Mihçak [41] provide a theoretical analysis approach using 
the Estimation Quantization (EQ) technique [42] and the spike process 
model [43] to evaluate data hiding capacity of real images. 
Voloshynovskiy et al. [44] propose the Edge Process (EP) model. Data 
hiding estimates based on the EP process are compared to those obtained 
using the EQ and spike process models. Reported results show that the 
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EP process achieved more accurate estimates for data hiding capacities 
yielding improved performance in terms or robustness and 
imperceptibility. Other applications including image compression and de-
noising have been considered therein.  
It should be noted that the most sophisticated statistical image models are 
implemented in the transform domain such as the Discrete Cosine 
Transform (DCT) or DWT domains. In the EP model, the DWT domain 
is used due to its relevance to the modeling of the subband wavelet 
coefficients. Also, the DWT has been preferred over the DCT for image 
coding applications in emerging standards such as JPEG 2000 image 
coding standard [52]. Moreover, the DWT provides a good energy 
compaction of the image being analyzed and it has desirable properties 
such as sparsity, locality and multi-resolution. 
3.4.1 Applications of the EP Model 
The EP model can be used for image regeneration using the image 
statistical descriptions; operational entropies (image compression); and 
image denoising. The entropy represents an average length of the code 
for lossless data representation. The EP model provides obvious 
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enhancement to image quality objectively and perceptually as compared 
to the EQ model. Moreover, the EP model achieves lower entropy as 
compared to the EQ model [45]. Many results demonstrate that the EP 
model yields better performance in reference applications [45]. 
3.4.2 Edge Process Analysis 
There are various models to characterize dependencies between wavelet 
coefficients. These models can be categorized into three groups: 
interscale dependencies; intrascale dependencies; and both 
dependencies. The EP model addresses the intrascale dependencies since 
they are usually stronger than the interscale dependencies as reported by 
Liu and Moulin [46].  
The GGD is the most widely used class of intrascale image models. The 
GGD model captures the global behavior of the wavelet coefficients. A 
significant gain can be achieved if the coefficients are considered being 
locally Gaussian rather than globally Laplacian. So, a mathematical 
relationship can be established between the local and global models. This 
relationship can be achieved using the infinite GMM model. In the EP 
model, the number of Gaussian channels is limited to K instead of an 
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infinite number. The image is split into K classes according to their 
variances of the wavelet subband coefficients. 
The global Laplacian PDF, px(x), can be obtained as a weighted mixture 
of zero-mean conditionally Gaussian PDFs, which is conditioned on the 
local variances σx2 and exponential prior on σx2 that capture the local image 
statistics: 
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This relationship provides a link between the global and local statistics of 
the image coefficients. Data is considered to be locally zero-mean 
Gaussian with the variance distributed according to the exponential PDF 
and having Laplacian global statistics at the same time.  
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3.4.3 Edge Process Definition 
Consider an image Z with support L. Let M1, M2,….., Mn be the set 
partitioning L where  all iMi are disjoint connected sets,  jMiM  for 
ji  and LlMl  . Ml is a region separated according to its variances as 
follows: 
 ])[,0(][: 2 iiZzM zllll    (24) 
All coefficients are approximated by a Gaussian distribution with 
different local variances ][2 ilz . The EP model assumes two distinctive 
sets of coefficients in wavelet domain for each subband. One set 
belonging to the flat region and one set belonging to edges and texture 
regions. Propagating along the edge, any transition corresponding to an 
edge or to a fragment of texture consists of several distinct mean values.  
Scalar Uniform Threshold Quantizer (UTQ) is used to segment regions. It 
is used for a given subband that is characterized by global GGD. It was 
assumed that the UTQ has uniformly spaced decision levels.  
After segmentation, the EP model regions are defined as follows: 
  ][,0][: 21 iiZzM z   (25) 
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where j is used to indicate the data behavior along the jth local edge, 
LMM 21  and L represents a particular subband. Region M1 represents 
all flat regions within a subband and is assumed to be zero-mean 
Gaussian random variables with local variance ][2 iz . Region M2 
represents texture and edges regions. In region M2, each distinctive 
geometrical structure corresponding to edge or texture transition is 
decomposed into a set of local mean constellations. A particular mean 
value ][izj , j= 1, …., J where J is the number of mean levels, propagates 
along the edge creating edge process. Edge parameters and orientations 
depend on the mutual orientation of the edge and of the subband. Usually 
transitions along the edge have longer stationary length than the 
transitions within the texture. This explains the existence of higher 
correlations along the edges. Moreover, the stationary condition is stricter 
for edges than for textures.  
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CHAPTER 4 
PROPOSED TECHNIQUES 
In this Chapter, the proposed techniques in this thesis are explained in 
details. First, a fuzzy-vault scheme for securing iris templates has been 
implemented as described by Nandakumar [9]. Then, a new 
watermarking technique for protecting fingerprint images using the edge 
process model has been implemented. 
4.1 Fuzzy-vault for Iris Templates 
In this Section fuzzy-vault for iris templates is going to be implemented 
as described by Section 2.2.1.  
First, human iris needs to be recognized by computer system. This task 
has been accomplished through Masek‟s implementation [10] of 
Daugman‟s [11] algorithm, which has been described in details in Section 
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3.1. This algorithm takes an iris image and extracts the iris from other eye 
parts. After that the iris will be normalized resulting in an iris code of a 
specific size. Figure 30 illustrates two different iris codes generated by 
Masek‟s implementation. 
 
Figure 30: Example of two different iris codes. 
As stated earlier in Section 2.2.1, that the iris code is a fixed length 
binary vector and the relative order between the bits is extremely 
important for matching. Because of this, iris code cannot be secured 
directly with fuzzy-vault construct. To solve this problem, a salt invariant 
function needs to be applied first.  
Fuzzy-vault has two phases (As seen previously in Figure 9): vault 
encoding and vault decoding. These phases are explained in details in the 
following Sections. 
84 
 
4.1.1 Vault Encoding 
In this phase, there are two steps. In the first step, an invertible 
transformation function is applied to the iris code template based on a 
randomly generated transformation key. In the second step, the 
transformation key is presented as an unordered set and is secured using 
fuzzy vault construct. The vault encoding phase has been summarized in 
Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31: Vault encoding phase. 
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The first step consists of two operations BCH encoding and an exclusive-
or operation. BCH encoding is a type of error-control codes (ECCs) that 
are used to increase the robustness of the transformed iris template. Let B 
be a BCH (ZI, ZK) encoding function, which takes a message M of length 
ZK (ZK < ZI) and appends (ZI – ZK) error correcting symbols to it in order 
to generate a codeword T = B (M) of length ZI. A primitive binary BCH 
encoding scheme has been employed, where ZI is chosen to be (2
j
 – 1) 
and j is an integer greater than or equal to 3. 
Let TT be an iris code template of length NI bits that is to be secured using 
the fuzzy vault. Firstly, the template TT is partitioned into r non-
overlapping components where each component contains exactly ZI bits. 
r is selected such that rZI > NI. When NI < rZI, an appropriate number (i.e 
(rZI – NI)) of zero bits are appended to the iris code template. Next, r 
vectors are randomly as M1, M2,. . ., Mr, each of length ZK bits. These 
vectors constitute the transformation key K1 of length rZK bits. The BCH 
encoder B is applied individually to the binary vectors M1, M2,. . ., Mr to 
obtain the codewords B(M1), B(M2), . . ., B(Mr). Finally, an exclusive-or 
operation is performed between the r codewords generated by the BCH 
encoder and the corresponding components of the iris code template to 
86 
 
obtain the components of the transformed iris code. The encoding phase 
can be represented as a function F1 that takes the iris code template TT 
and the transformation key K1 as inputs and generates the transformed iris 
code T* such that T* = F1 (TT, K1).  
The key K1 has been secured using the fuzzy vault construct. Key 
recovery (decoding) has been designed in such a way that it does not 
require the relative order information between the components of key K1. 
The components set of K1 and random chaff points will be encoded. A 
second key K2 is used. K2 is of length 16n bits where n is the degree of the 
encoding polynomial. A 16-bit CRC code is appended to the secret key 
K2 in order to obtain a new secret key K2' containing 16(n + 1) bits. The 
generator polynomial for CRC is G (x) = x16 + x15 + x2 + 1. The secret 
key K2' is encoded into a polynomial P of degree n in F by partitioning it 
into (n + 1)16-bits values c0, c1,. . ., cn and considering them as 
coefficients of P, i.e.  P (x) = cn x
n
 + . . . + c0. Then, the polynomial P is 
evaluated at all points in key set K1 and chaff points. After that, the 
elements are randomly reordered to obtain the vault U. Only the vault U 
and transformed iris code T* will be stored in the system. Figure 32 
shows an example of encoded vault.  
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Figure 32: Example of encoded vault. The blue points are the key points and the red points are 
random chaff points. 
4.1.2 Vault Decoding 
Vault decoding phase or key recovery consists of two main steps. First, 
the inverse transform is applied to the transformed iris code template T* 
using the query iris code TQ. Since the template and query iris codes will 
not be identical due to intra-user variations, the recovered key K1' may 
have some errors. Second, the transformation key K1' is used to decode 
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the vault U. If the template and query iris codes are sufficiently similar, 
the recovered key K1' will be sufficiently similar to K1 and the vault can 
be successfully decoded. 
The inverse transform consists of two operations, an exclusive-or 
operation followed by BCH decoding. Let TQ be the query iris code of 
length NI bits. The query TQ has been partitioned into r non-overlapping 
components and each component contains exactly ZI bits. An exclusive-
or operation is performed between the r components of the query iris 
code and the corresponding components of the transformed iris code T* to 
obtain the corrupted code words. Let B
-1
 be a (ZI, ZK) primitive binary 
BCH decoding function that takes a corrupted codeword B' (M) of length 
ZI and decodes it into a message M' of length ZK. If the Hamming 
distance between the corrupted codeword B'(M) and the original 
codeword B(M) is less than the error correcting capability of the BCH 
coding scheme, the decoded message M' would be the same as the 
original message M. 
The corrupted codeword B'(M) has been decoded using the BCH decoder 
to recover the components of the transformation key K1'. Due to problems 
such as occlusion, there may be large differences between some of the 
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template and query iris code components and the corresponding 
components of the transformation key that cannot be recovered correctly. 
To find the coefficients of a polynomial of degree n, (n + 1) unique 
projections are necessary. A polynomial P* is constructed by Lagrange 
interpolation. After that, the coefficients of the polynomial are 
concatenated to obtain a 16(n + 1)-bit string K2* and CRC error detection 
is applied to K2*. The vault decoding phase is summarized in Figure 33. 
Fuzzy-vault is applied to one iris image from CASIA database [47] and is 
decoded in order to be tested on other instances of the same iris. CASIA 
database [47] contains iris images with multiple instances for each iris 
image. In Figure 34, overlapping points are shown after decoding the 
vault of instance 1 and comparing it with the other iris instances. The 
overlapping points are highlighted by green circles. For instance 1, the 
number of overlapping points is 16 because it is the same template used 
for encoding. On the other hand, the numbers of overlapping points for 
the other instances are 3, 6, 4, 6, and 6 respectively. It should be noticed 
that the total number of points is 16. The overlapping points with the 
other instances are always less than half of the total points. This is 
because there is no biometric registration in this algorithm. Biometric 
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registration makes alignment between biometric image instances to be 
approximately the same.  
In Figure 35, fuzzy-vault is applied for a right eye‟s iris and is compared 
to the corresponding left one. The Figure shows that 7 points are 
overlapping (highlighted by green) and is still lower than half of the total 
points.  
 
Figure 33: Vault decoding phase. 
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Figure 34: Fuzzy-vault for multiple instances of one iris image. 
 
Figure 35: Fuzzy-vault for right and left irises. 
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4.2 Fingerprint Data Watermarking 
In this algorithm, fingerprint data is watermarked using edge process 
model that has been discussed in detail in Section 3.3. Watermark 
payload will be hidden in the most salient areas in fingerprint images like 
curvatures and edges. Before watermarking, many steps need to be 
carried out. These steps have been summarized as follows: 
1- Enhance the fingerprint image. 
2- Detect the core point or the singular point. 
3- Separate the unused parts from the used ones. 
4-  Apply edge process model to determine edges. 
5- Apply watermark hiding. 
Some fingerprint images have bad quality. This is possibly, due to the 
sensor surface, or bad quality sensor. For this purpose, the method in [48] 
has been used for fingerprint image enhancement. This method is based 
on Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT) analysis. Figure 36 illustrates 
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an example of bad quality fingerprint image and after its enhancement 
using STFT analysis. 
 
Figure 36: Example of bad quality fingerprint image (left side) and its enhancement using STFT 
analysis (right side). 
In the second step, the singular point or the core point needs to be 
determined. Singular point region is the area where the ridge curvature is 
higher than normal and where the direction of the ridge changes rapidly. 
Poincare index algorithm in [49] has been used for this purpose. This step 
helps to determine which area is the most important region that should be 
included in the watermarked image. Figure 37 shows the singular point of 
fingerprint image in Figure 36. 
94 
 
 
Figure 37: Singular point detection using Poincare index. 
In step three, the unused regions of the fingerprint image need to be 
separated from the used one.  SUSAN algorithm [50] for edge detection 
has been used for this purpose. This algorithm filters the image based on 
a predefined threshold. Figure 38 illustrates the fingerprint image in 
Figure 37 after removing extra parts based on SUSAN algorithm and 
locating the singular point. 
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Figure 38: Fingerprint image after removing the extra parts using SUSAN algorithm. 
After that, the edge process model is applied to the fingerprint image. 
The first step in edge process model is to convert the image to the 
Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) domain. Daubechies family of 
Wavelet Transform has been used. The image should be resized to be a 
square image before Wavelet Transform. In this case, the image has been 
resized to be 512×512. Figure 39 shows the image in Figure 38 after 
applying resizing and the DWT. 
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Figure 39: A) Image after resizing. B) Image after applying DWT. 
Next, the edge process model is applied to the transformed image. As 
explained in Section 3.3, the image is classified or quantized based on its 
variances to separate flat regions from edge and texture regions. 
Variances of the transformed image are estimated for each subband 
separately. After that a clustering or quantization process is applied to a 
quantized image with K channels. 256 channels have been used as 
clustering bins. Next, UTQ is calculated based on the quantized variances 
to classify the edges and the flat regions. Figure 40 illustrates how edges 
appear after applying the edge process model. 
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Figure 40: Edges determined using edge process model. 
The image is now ready for hiding the watermark into it. The watermark 
is hidden in the image in the wavelet domain. The used watermark 
system is illustrated in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41: Proposed watermarking system. 
As seen from Figure 41, two processes are executed in the watermarking 
process: watermark embedding and watermark extraction. It is similar to 
the system proposed by Bastug and Sankur [51], but with BCH encoding 
being used instead of LDPC encoding.  
In the watermark embedding process, two keys are used. Key1 is the 
payload that is going to be embedded and key2 is used for spread 
spectrum modulation. Key1 can be an ID, for example, and key2 can be 
any binary sequence. To increase the watermark robustness, a type of 
error control code (ECC) is applied to Key1 in binary representation. 
BCH encoding is used for this purpose. After BCH encoding, data is 
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modulated with spread spectrum using key2. After that, the watermark is 
embedded in the host image in the DWT domain. The watermark is going 
to be hidden into the edges in all subbands except the first subband, the 
approximation sub-band. Hiding is done according to the following 
formula: 
)1( iiii zmxc       (27) 
where i is the ith coefficient, xi is the original coefficient, λ is the 
embedding strength, mi is the ±1 spread spectrum element of the 
watermark, and zi is the watermark value. After watermark embedding, 
the image needs to be transformed back to the spatial domain. Finally, the 
image is watermarked. 
In the watermark extraction process, the image needs to be transformed 
to DWT again. Edges have to be synchronized between the sender and 
the receiver because the extraction is based on the edges. Maximum-
Likelihood is used to extract the watermark bits from its footprint 
coefficients. The DWT channel models the carrier coefficients according 
to Generalized Gaussian Distribution (GGD). Scale and shape parameters 
(αi, βi) are estimated for each coefficient. An 8×8 window is used for 
each coefficient to estimate its (αi, βi). Extraction of scale and shape 
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parameter for GGD is done using ML as described by Minh Do in [39]. 
After that, the ML decision to extract the watermark bit will be 1 if 
)(r
DWT
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where λ is the embedding strength, and mi is the ±1 spread spectrum 
element for the received coefficient. This process is used for all 
coefficients that are hiding data in edges.  
The previous formula results in a BCH encoded sequence. The 
watermark is decoded by the BCH decoder to get the key. This key is 
compared to key1. Then, a decision is made whether it is an authentic 
fingerprint image or not. Figure 42 shows the original image and the 
same image after watermarking by using the proposed algorithm. It is 
noticed from Figure 42 that the images are visually the same and that 
there is no degradation in quality. 
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Figure 42: a) Original image b) Watermarked image. 
To make sure that the proposed algorithm has not cause a severe 
degradation for image quality, minutiae points [3] have been identified 
for the original image, enhanced image, and watermarked image using 
the proposed algorithm. Figure 43 illustrates the result of minutiae 
identification. The numbers of minutiae points for the three images are 
30, 26 and 27 respectively. The proposed algorithm did not cause a 
severe degradation as the minutiae points are reduced by 3. Applying this 
test for multiple images, it is found that watermarked fingerprint images 
using the edge process model have almost the same number of minutiae 
points as the enhanced image. Sometimes, the number of minutiae points 
in the watermarked image is less than that in the original image by 3 
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points on average. Therefore, the proposed approach does not affect the 
minutiae points considerably. 
 
Figure 43: Minutiae points a) Original image b) Enhanced image c) Watermarked image using EP. 
 
4.3 Variations in the Proposed Algorithms 
After giving a detailed analysis of the proposed algorithms, it is 
legitimate to inquire about the possibility of swapping the biometric 
content used in the proposed techniques. More specifically, a typical 
question would be: is it possible to embed watermark payload data into 
iris images and apply fuzzy-vault protection using fingerprint images? 
To answer this question, an understanding of the underlying modeling 
processes is required. First, let‟s consider Figure 44 which shows the 
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result of applying the EP modeling on a sample iris image. It is clear that 
the EP modeling yields very poor results since most of the useful 
information in a typical iris image consists of textures which cannot be 
properly modeled by the EP process [44]. On the other side, fingerprint 
images can be successfully used with the proposed fuzzy vault scheme 
provided some modifications are carried out to account for novelty. 
 
Figure 44: a) sample of normalized iris b) edges map after using the EP model. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
5.1  Introduction 
In this Chapter, performance analysis of the proposed algorithms, 
described in Chapter 4, is carried out in details. First, the proposed fuzzy 
vault technique for iris template protection is investigated through several 
experiments. A small iris database is used to conduct these experiments. 
Cryptanalysis of the proposed method is carried out through several iris 
image manipulation and alteration techniques. To assess the algorithm 
robustness, iris images, selected from the iris database, are secured 
through fuzzy vault. Then, a set of image filters is applied to these iris 
images. To evaluate the algorithm robustness, codes generated from the 
fuzzy vault block using unaltered and altered iris image templates are 
compared using a specific comparison metric.  
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The assessment of the proposed watermarking algorithm, detailed in 
Section 4.2, is implemented by embedding the watermark payload in 
image locations other than those determined by the edge process. The 
extra embedding is aimed to highlight the robustness of the EP-based 
watermarking scheme. More specifically, the watermark payload is 
additively embedded in all wavelet subbands except the approximation 
subband to achieve watermark imperceptibility. It should be noted that 
the watermark payload is “selectively” embedded in the strongest wavelet 
coefficients in the proposed watermarking scheme to meet the conflicting 
requirements of robustness and imperceptibility. However, it should be 
clear from the proposed embedding approach reconciles between 
watermark robustness and imperceptibility at the expense of capacity. 
Moreover, to “fairly” compare both embedding schemes, different 
repetition rates are applied to the watermark payload in both cases. 
Finally, the performance of both schemes is assessed based on watermark 
decoding after applying a set of image filters similar to that applied in the 
iris template algorithm. To increase the watermark robustness, error-
control codes (ECCs) are applied on the binary format of the payloads 
before embedding in the coefficients of the wavelet subbands. Therefore, 
watermark decoding is viewed a data communication problem over noisy 
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channel where the watermark data represents the signal and the host 
images represent the noise. It is clear that this is a typical data 
communication system at very low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). 
The remaining of the Chapter is organized as follows. The biometric iris 
and fingerprint databases used in the computer experiments are described 
in Section 5.2. Also, the setups of the computer experiments conducted to 
assess the performance of the proposed algorithms are described therein. 
Performance results are reported and analyzed in Section 5.3. 
5.2 Experiments and Data Setup 
5.2.1 Experiment Setup for Fuzzy-vault-based Iris 
Template Protection 
The fuzzy-vault scheme proposed for the protection of iris templates has 
been tested using a set of iris images from the CASIA database [47]. Ten 
test images are used for this purpose. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the iris 
templates are generated using Daugman‟s algorithm [11]. Each iris 
template consists of a binary sequence whose length is 20×480 bits. The 
variables Zk and Zi (see Section 4.1 for details) are set to 16 and 31, 
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respectively. Consequently, the codes of the iris templates are extended 
to 20×496 bits. The extended length fits the random key Key1 (see 
Section 4.1 for details). Key1 is partitioned into r components. On each 
component of the key, an ECC code, BCH (31, 16) code, is applied to 
increase its robustness.  
Template attacks are carried out by the following image filters: blurring, 
motion, and sharpening filters. Blurring is generated by circular 
averaging filter of radius ranging from 1 to 10. For the motion filtering, 
image pixels are increasingly moved from 1 pixel to 10 pixels with no 
angle effect in place. Similarly, the sharpening filter is gradually applied 
to assess the robustness of the proposed scheme. It is interesting to note 
that the applied filters have different effects on the manipulated image. 
Figure 45 illustrates the effect of the different image filters on the 
perceived quality of the manipulated image. Image quality is measured 
using the well-known peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) measure [52]. 
Usually, the PSNR measure is given by [52]: 
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where I(x, y) and I
’
(x,y) are the NxM original and manipulated images, 
respectively. Since, the image difference, given by Equation 26, is an 
energy measure at the logarithmic scale, the PSNR metric is expressed in 
Decibels (dB) units. 
  
Figure 45: Image filtering effects on perceived image quality. 
It is worth noting that a PSNR value of infinity dB is achieved for 
identical images. Also, a PSNR value below 25 dB would indicate major 
differences in the perceived quality of the manipulated image with 
respect to the original one.  It is also noted that the blurring and motion 
filters have similar effects and “slightly” affect the image quality. Unlike 
blurring and motion filters, the sharpening filter drastically degrades the 
quality of the manipulated image. Finally, Figure 45 can be used as a 
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guide to conduct the template attack experiments. More specifically, to 
mimic “mild” attacks, blurring and motion are preferred while sharpening 
filters are selected to represent “harsh” attacks. Such scenarios are always 
considered in cryptanalysis investigations to cover a wide spectrum of 
attacks ranging from mild to severe.  
5.2.2 Experiment Setup for Watermarking-based 
Fingerprint Image Protection 
The performance of watermarking algorithm, described in Section 4.2, is 
evaluated using a chosen set of fingerprint images. These images are 
displayed in Figure 46. To restrict the watermark embedding domain to 
meaningful fingerprint areas, a separation algorithm [50] is used to 
separate “useful” fingerprint parts from unused ones. The separation 
technique is threshold-based. Several threshold values have been 
evaluated. Finally, a threshold value of 10 is selected for its improved 
performance. After fingerprint segmentation, fingerprint images are 
transformed using the discrete wavelet transform (DWT). Five (5) 
decomposition levels are used in conformity with the current practices of 
DWT-based image coders. At this decomposition level, 16 wavelet 
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subbands are obtained. To reduce the dynamic range of the subband 
variances, the latter are quantized to 256 bins yielding 256 watermark 
embedding channels.  
During the watermark embedding process, watermark payloads 
consisting of 1024 bits are considered. To strengthen the watermark 
security, BCH (127, 120) codes are used for error control purposes at the 
encoding stage.  
Unlike the filters used in the performance evaluation of the fuzzy-vault-
based iris template protection algorithm, more filters are required for the 
evaluation of the robustness of the proposed watermarking scheme. In 
fact, seven types of filters are applied on the test fingerprint images. The 
selected filters are: standard-deviation, median, motion, Wiener, rotation, 
blurring, and JPEG compression filtering. It is interesting to note that the 
selected filters not only extend the spectrum of potential attacks but also 
include a set of unintentional alterations committed by “legitimate” users. 
For instance, it is a common practice to convert the image format and 
apply lossy compression provided by most image processing/editing tools 
widely available. Moreover, JPEG compression attack is viewed as a 
“combined” lowpass and highpass filtering where different emphasis 
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weights are used. Finally, to have an “equal-foot” comparison, watermark 
payloads are embedded using all wavelet subbands and subband edges 
determined by the edge process. Similar to the experiment, mentioned 
previously, to quantify the filtering effects on the perceived image 
quality, the selected filters, defined above, are applied on several 
fingerprint images and their perceived qualities are measured using the 
PSNR metric. Figures 47 and 48 illustrate the effects of the seven filters. 
PSNRs based on image filters using windows of varying lengths are 
reported in Figure 47. Results using non-window filters are shown in 
Figure 48. 
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Figure 46: Set of fingerprint images used. 
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Figure 47: Filtering effects of window-based filters. 
 
Figure 48: Filtering effects of non-window filters. 
It is interesting to notice in Figure 47 that the standard deviation filtering 
(STD) has severely corrupted the test image unlike Wiener and median 
filters. Basically, the STD filter replaces every pixel in the manipulated 
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image by the standard deviation of a block of neighboring pixels. Such 
alteration results in large-scale pixel modification. However, Wiener and 
median filters replace each pixel by the average and median of a block of 
neighboring pixels, respectively. Such alterations bring small-scale pixel 
modification. Similarly, JPEG filtering has mild effects similar to those 
caused by Wiener and median filtering. This is due to the fact that JPEG 
compression can be viewed as a lowpass filtering as mentioned above.  
On the other hand, rotation filtering has severe effects on the quality of 
the altered image as indicated in Figure 48. It should be noted that image 
rotation represents one of the hardest geometric attacks that most of the 
existing watermarking schemes fail to withstand [32]. Finally, blurring 
and motion filters are considered as “mild” attacks given the reasonable 
PSNR yielded by these filters. 
Although the attacks assessed in this thesis represent the core of possible 
intentional and unintentional attacks, the performance of the proposed 
watermarking scheme has been evaluated and benchmarked using 
StirMark benchmarking tool [53]. The proposed algorithm achieved good 
performance. Under mild attacks, the PSNR for attacked watermarked 
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images achieved around 30 dB. For severe attacks, the PSNR dropped to 
values ranging around 20 dB. 
5.3 Performance Results 
5.3.1 Fuzzy-vault-based Iris Template Protection 
As indicated in Section 5.2.1, a test sample of ten iris images is used 
where three types of filtering are applied. Figure 49 illustrates the effect 
of blurring on a sample iris test image. Blurring is applied using various 
scales. 
 
Figure 49: Blurring effects on sample iris image. 
To replicate severe adverse environments, the blurring filter has been 
applied at ten different scales ranging from 1 to 10. Once, the iris code is 
estimated from the blurred image (attack sample), the number of 
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overlapping points (see Figure 8 for details) is estimated. Then, the 
extracted key and the stored vault values are compared for matching 
purposes. This process is carried out for the entire iris test images along 
with their blurred version. Figure 52 shows the averaged results for the 
performance evaluation. 
In the case of attack-free conditions, the number of overlapping points is 
16 as indicated in Figure 52. It is interesting to note that the number of 
overlapping points is decreased due to the blurring filtering. More 
specifically, it decreases to 7 due a blurring filter with angle θ = 1. For 
higher blurring degrees, the number of overlapping points vanishes 
completely. Therefore, it is concluded that blurring filtering constitutes a 
severe attack that drastically degrades the security of the fuzzy-vault-
based iris template security. It has been noticed that using less than half 
of the original overlapping points leads to a meaningless protection 
effort. 
The effect of motion filtering on iris test images is illustrated in Figure 
50. Similar to the blurring effect, motion filtering is applied using ten 
different scales ranging from 1 to 10. According to the PSNR measures, 
motion filtering does not always compromise the perceived quality of the 
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iris test images. However, it should be noted, as indicated by Figure 50, 
that the iris texture component is affected by the motion filtering which 
would impact the quality of the resulting iris code (iris feature). To 
illustrate the effects of motion filtering on iris images, Figure 50 shows a 
sample iris image undergoing the motion filtering process using different 
scales. 
 
Figure 50: Motion effects on iris images. 
Using a motion factor of 1, the quality of iris texture and therefore the iris 
template is not altered by the motion filtering. In this case, after the 
extraction of the iris code, the number of overlapping points is 16. This 
clearly indicates applying mild motions on iris images would not change 
the iris templates which would imply that both iris images (original and 
attacked) are declared identical. However, while the more motion is 
applied on the iris image, the less the number of overlapping points. For 
instance, Figure 52 shows that for motion factors of 3 and more, the 
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number of overlapping points would drop to 7 which would mean that the 
original and attacked iris images will be declared different. The variations 
in number of overlapping points between original and attacked iris 
images are reported in Figure 52 for the filtering attacks considered in 
this performance evaluation. In conclusion, it safe to state that motion 
filtering has less impact on the performance of the proposed fuzzy-vault-
based for the protection of the iris templates than the blurring filtering 
although the number of overlapping points is dropping by half for motion 
factors more than 3. 
Unlike motion and blurring filtering, sharpening has affected more 
severely the perceived quality of the iris images as illustrated in Figure 
45 by the PSNR measure. Sharpening is applied cumulatively up to ten 
times on sample iris images. Figure 51 shows the effect of sharpening on 
the quality of a sample iris image. Using a cumulative factor of 1, the 
attacked iris image has preserved some of the original iris texture details. 
However, using a cumulative factor of 5, the texture details have been 
completely corrupted. In this case, the resulting iris feature (iris codes) 
would be completely different than that pertaining to the original iris 
image.  
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Figure 51: Sharpening effects on iris images. 
As expected from Figures 45and 49, the performance of the proposed 
fuzzy-vault-bases iris template protection algorithm in the presence of 
sharpening filtering attack is very poor. This finding is clearly indicated 
by Figure 52. Moreover, unlike the previous filtering process (motion and 
blurring), sharpening filtering not only deteriorates the perceived quality 
of the iris images but also drastically reduces the number of overlapping 
points even at moderate cumulative factors of sharpening.  
In summary, fuzzy-vault-based protection is recommended for securing 
iris templates in the presence of moderate attacks using motion and 
blurring filtering. However, the proposed scheme performs very poorly in 
the presence of sharpening filtering attacks as suggested by the findings 
of the computer experiments carried out in this Chapter. 
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Figure 52: Performance of fuzzy-vault-based iris template protection under various filtering attacks.  
 
5.3.2 Watermarking-based Fingerprint Image 
Protection 
In order to provide a benchmarking framework for the proposed 
watermarking-based fingerprint protection, watermark embedding is 
performed using: 1) the coefficients of the entire high-frequency wavelet 
subbands and; 2) the wavelets coefficients selected by the edge process. 
It should be noted in both cases, the low-frequency (approximation) 
subband is not considered for watermark embedding process to ensure 
watermark imperceptibility.   
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As mentioned previously in Section 5.2.2, seven types of filters have 
been applied to the watermarked fingerprint images using different scales 
and factors. The reported performance results have been averaged over 
all the fingerprint test images considered in this experiment. To measure 
the performance of the proposed watermarking scheme, the total number 
of bits in difference between the original and decoded (recovered) 
watermark sequences is considered. This measure is known as the bit-
error-rate (BER) commonly used in data communication problems. This 
is reminiscent of a pure digital communication system.  
These seven filters have been categorized into three categories where 
each category is different in its measures and scales. The first category 
represents the windowed filters, compression filters (JPEG and other) are 
represented by the second category. The last category represents non-
windowed filters. 
The first category of windowed filters included three the following 
filters: 1) standard-deviation filtering (STD); 2) Wiener filtering; and 3) 
median filtering. In the category of filters, five window sizes have been 
used ranging from 3x3 to 11x11. The quality of the test fingerprint is 
most severely damaged by STD filtering as indicated by Figure 53. At 
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moderate window sizes, STD filtering is viewed as a mild sharpening 
process. However, using large windows (9×9 and 11×11), the salient 
points of the fingerprint image (mainly ridges containing minutiae points) 
are completely altered. In fact, image edges have been fused which would 
be a challenging task even for robust edge-directed schemes such as the 
one proposed in this thesis. On the other side, Wiener filtering has little 
effect on the perceived quality of the test fingerprint image if not 
improving its quality by removing parts of the background noise which is 
the very purpose of Wiener filtering. Finally, median filtering acts like a 
high-pass filtering process (kind of sharpening) where each pixel is 
replaced by the median value of some neighboring pixels. Usually, this 
process is favored for mitigating the effects of outliers (edges in the case 
of images).     
Figure 54 summarizes the performance of the decoding process of the 
watermark payload from watermarked fingerprint images in the presence 
of STD filtering attack. As hinted by Figure 53, neither the proposed 
watermarking nor the benchmark algorithm has achieved an acceptable 
performance. This is mainly due to the fact that most of the fingerprint 
features are destroyed using this type of attack using moderate and large 
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window sizes. Under median and Wiener filtering attacks, the proposed 
watermarking technique has yielded better performance that the 
benchmark watermarking technique as indicated in Figures 55 and 56.   
 
Figure 53: Effects of windowed filters on a sample fingerprint image. (a) STD filtering. (b) Median 
filtering. (c) Wiener filtering. 
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Figure 54: Watermark decoding performance in the presence of STD filtering attack. 
 
Figure 55: Watermark decoding performance in the presence of median filtering attack. 
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Figure 56: Watermark decoding performance in the presence of Wiener filtering attack. 
To assess the performance of the proposed watermarking technique under 
JPEG compression attack, the watermarked fingerprint images have been 
compressed using various JPEG quality factors ranging from 100 to 10. 
A JPEG quality of 100 means a high quality compressed image at a very 
low compression rate and a value of 1 would mean a highly compressed 
image at a high compression rate and a poor perceptual quality [52]. 
Figure 57 illustrates the visual effect of JPEG compression on a 
watermarked fingerprint image using JPEG quality factors of 100 and 20. 
Figure 57.a shows the original fingerprint image and the compressed 
JPEG images at quality factors 100 and 20 are shown in Figure 57.b. and 
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Figure 57.c, respectively. At such quality factors, the JPEG compression 
filter has mild and moderate effects on the test fingerprint images. 
 
Figure 57: JPEG compression effect. (a) Original image. (b) JPEG compressed image using quality 
factor of 100. (c) JPEG compressed image using quality factor of 20. 
It should be noted from Figure 57 that JPEG compression using such 
quality factors contributes to the refinement of the fingerprint ridges and 
contours. 
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Figure 58: Watermark decoding performance in the presence of JPEG compression attack. 
Figure 58 summarizes the performance of the proposed watermarking 
scheme in the presence of JPEG compression attack. The JPEG quality 
factor has been varied from 100 (mild attack) to 10 (severe attack). It is 
clear that the proposed watermarking technique has yielded better 
performance than the benchmark watermarking technique. 
The effects of the filters pertaining to the third category of attacks 
(blurring, rotation and motion) on a watermarked fingerprint image are 
illustrated in Figure 59. These filters have been applied on test images 
using factors ranging from 1 (mild attack) to 10 (severe attack).  
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Figure 59: The effect of the third category filters on a watermarked fingerprint image. (a) Effect of 
blurring filtering attack. (b) Effect of rotation filtering attack. (c) Effect of motion filtering attack.  
As indicated by Figure 59, the blurring filtering attack is the most severe 
attack applied on test fingerprint images in terms of PSNR measures. 
Moreover, it should be noted that rotation, a well-known geometric 
attack, is the hardest attack that most of the existing watermarking 
algorithms easily fail to withstand. Applying motion using simple motion 
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factors does not affect much the perceptual quality of the watermarked 
images and therefore has little affect on the performance of the proposed 
watermarking algorithm as suggested by Figure 62. However, unlike 
motion filtering attack, blurring and rotation attacks have more negative 
impacts on the performance of the proposed algorithm as shown in 
Figures 60 and 61.  
 
Figure 60: Watermark decoding performance in the presence of blurring filtering attack. 
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Figure 61: Watermark decoding performance in the presence of rotation filtering attack. 
 
Figure 62: Watermark decoding performance in the presence of motion filtering attack. 
In conclusion, based on the results reported in Figures 60-62, the 
proposed watermarking algorithm has not only yielded better 
performance than the benchmark watermarking algorithm but it should be 
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kept in mind that the proposed algorithm embeds the watermark payload 
in less locations that the benchmark one which would make it more 
vulnerable to a variety of attacks. However, the reported results clearly 
indicate that this is not the case. The improvement in performance is 
mainly contributed to the “selectivity” of the watermark embedding 
process adopted by the proposed algorithm. The selected subband 
wavelet coefficients effectively represent the “genuine” robust features of 
the images being watermarked, i.e., fingerprint edges.  
5.3.3 Performance Analysis of EyeCerts® 
Algorithm 
The functionality of EyeCerts® algorithm, outlined in Section 2.3.1, is 
implemented to assess the performance of this certification algorithm. 
Figure 63 gives the details of the implementation diagram of EyeCerts® 
algorithm adopted in this thesis. It was tested on a set of iris images from 
CASIA database [47]. It contains seven iris sample images for each 
subject taken over different sessions where 108 subjects (different 
people) were enrolled. EyeCerts® [12] makes a binary decision about the 
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subject authenticity. In this case, two types of errors can be used to assess 
its performance. These errors are: 1) false positive and 2) false negative 
alarms. False positive alarm occurs when two iris images pertaining to 
different subjects are declared otherwise. On the other hand, false 
negative alarm takes place when two iris images from a same subject are 
declared belonging to two different subjects. In this performance 
evaluation, EyeCerts® achieved a false negative rate around 0.05 and a 
false positive rate of 10
-5
. 
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Figure 63: Implementation diagram of EyeCerts® algorithm. 
5.3.4 Performance Analysis of FaceCerts® 
Algorithm 
The functionality of FaceCerts® algorithm [13], outlined in Section 2.3.2, 
is implemented to assess the performance of this certification algorithm. 
Figure 64 gives the details of the implementation diagram of FaceCerts® 
algorithm adopted in this thesis. To circumvent the problems associated 
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with the face-based recognition algorithms, FaceCerts® does not depend 
on the face matching results; it relies only on the Euclidean distance 
between the encoded face image in the barcode and the photo. A 
performance evaluation has been carried out over 1000+ FaceCerts® 
demo tests. A false negative rate of less than 10
-4 
has been achieved. 
Using a different set of 20,400 different pairs of facial photos, another 
performance evaluation has been carried out achieving a false positive 
rate of less than 10
-6
. 
 
Figure 64: Implementation diagram of FaceCerts® algorithm. 
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5.4 Conclusions and Summary 
In summary to this Chapter, the previous results have shown that fuzzy-
vault-based protection is performing well for securing iris templates in 
the presence of moderate attacks using motion and blurring filtering. On 
the other hand, it performs very poorly in the presence of sharpening 
filtering attacks as derived by the findings of the experiments carried out 
in this Chapter. 
The proposed watermarking algorithm has yielded better performance 
than the benchmark one. Meanwhile, the proposed algorithm embeds the 
watermark payload in fewer locations which make it more resistible to a 
variety of attacks in comparison to the benchmark watermarking. 
However, the reported results clearly indicate that the proposed algorithm 
has achieved good results while retrieving watermark. On the other hand 
it is noticed that it very weak against geometrical attacks.  
Finally, the two certified biometric systems have been clearly 
demonstrated and there results have been shown. They achieved a very 
low rate for false positive and false negative measures. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter gives a summary of main thesis contributions and 
guidelines for possible future work directions based on the presented 
research findings. 
6.1  Summary 
Biometric authentication nowadays is becoming a very important task in 
comparison with traditional authentication techniques. In this thesis, the 
advantages of biometric authentication, biometric systems and their 
components, attacks that face biometric systems, and how to secure and 
evaluate biometric systems have been discussed.  
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The work of this thesis has been concentrated on securing biometric 
templates and data. The security schemes for securing biometric data 
have been demonstrated and compared. These schemes are biometric 
cryptography, biometric watermarking, and the certification of biometric 
systems. Fuzzy-vault scheme for securing iris data has been implemented 
and its robustness has been demonstrated against image filtering attacks. 
Furthermore, a new technique for fingerprint watermarking has been 
developed and its performance evaluated. Finally the results of evaluation 
have been presented. 
6.2 Future Work 
In the future, this work can be extended to secure other biometric data 
like face and palm-print, for example. Fuzzy-vault has just been 
implemented for securing fingerprints and iris templates. In the future, it 
can be extended to secure eigenfaces. Furthermore, we noticed that the 
fuzzy-vault scheme for iris templates is very weak against attacks like 
blurring, motion and sharpening. This can be improved in the future to be 
more robust to these attacks and other attacks. 
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For the edge process watermarking, it can be extended to work with more 
biometric data images. It was noticed also that the edge process 
watermarking is very weak against geometrical attacks. This work can be 
improved to tolerate these types of attacks. Furthermore, edges need to be 
synchronized between the sender and the receiver or between the issuer 
and the authenticator. This is sometimes will be more boring. So this 
wants to be improved to let the authenticator extracts the watermark 
without synchronizing with the issuer. Finally, the Error Correcting Code 
(ECC) schemes are still weak and cannot achieve a very good precision. 
Their precision is somehow acceptable but still returning big error rates. 
This problem should be taken into consideration in the future to propose 
a new ECC that achieves a good precision for correcting errors. 
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